6 research outputs found
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property
We introduce a class of finite strategic games with the property that every
deviation of a coalition of players that is profitable to each of its members
strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain function defined on
the set of strategy profiles. We call this property the Lexicographical
Improvement Property (LIP) and show that it implies the existence of a
generalized strong ordinal potential function. We use this characterization to
derive existence, efficiency and fairness properties of strong Nash equilibria.
We then study a class of games that generalizes congestion games with
bottleneck objectives that we call bottleneck congestion games. We show that
these games possess the LIP and thus the above mentioned properties. For
bottleneck congestion games in networks, we identify cases in which the
potential function associated with the LIP leads to polynomial time algorithms
computing a strong Nash equilibrium. Finally, we investigate the LIP for
infinite games. We show that the LIP does not imply the existence of a
generalized strong ordinal potential, thus, the existence of SNE does not
follow. Assuming that the function associated with the LIP is continuous,
however, we prove existence of SNE. As a consequence, we prove that bottleneck
congestion games with infinite strategy spaces and continuous cost functions
possess a strong Nash equilibrium
A simple linear-time algorithm to recognize interval graphs
Available from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel C 141809 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman
A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games
This paper provides a comprehensive convergence analysis of the PoA of both
pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with unsplittable
demands.Comment: 57 page
Scheduling project networks with resource constraints and time windows
SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel C 154059 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman
Computing the bump number of ordered sets is easy
SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel C 152117 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman